2017
Yasin, Muhammad; Sengupta, Abhrajit; Nabeel, Mohammed Thari; Ashraf, Mohammed; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; Sinanoglu, Ozgur
Provably-secure logic locking: From theory to practice Proceedings Article
In: Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 1601–1618, Dallas, Texas, USA, 2017.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: Design For Trust, Hardware Trojan, Logic Locking, Obfuscation
@inproceedings{yasin2017provably,
title = {Provably-secure logic locking: From theory to practice},
author = {Muhammad Yasin and Abhrajit Sengupta and Mohammed Thari Nabeel and Mohammed Ashraf and Jeyavijayan Rajendran and Ozgur Sinanoglu},
doi = {10.1145/3133956.3133985},
year = {2017},
date = {2017-01-01},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
pages = {1601–1618},
address = {Dallas, Texas, USA},
series = {CCS '17},
abstract = {Logic locking has been conceived as a promising proactive defense strategy against intellectual property (IP) piracy, counterfeiting, hardware Trojans, reverse engineering, and overbuilding attacks. Yet, various attacks that use a working chip as an oracle have been launched on logic locking to successfully retrieve its secret key, undermining the defense of all existing locking techniques. In this paper, we propose stripped-functionality logic locking (SFLL), which strips some of the functionality of the design and hides it in the form of a secret key(s), thereby rendering on-chip implementation functionally different from the original one. When loaded onto an on-chip memory, the secret keys restore the original functionality of the design. Through security-aware synthesis that creates a controllable mismatch between the reverse-engineered netlist and original design, SFLL provides a quantifiable and provable resilience trade-off between all known and anticipated attacks. We demonstrate the application of SFLL to large designs (>100K gates) using a computer-aided design (CAD) framework that ensures attaining the desired security level at minimal implementation cost, 8%, 5%, and 0.5% for area, power, and delay, respectively. In addition to theoretical proofs and simulation confirmation of SFLL's security, we also report results from the silicon implementation of SFLL on an ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor in 65nm technology.},
keywords = {Design For Trust, Hardware Trojan, Logic Locking, Obfuscation},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Logic locking has been conceived as a promising proactive defense strategy against intellectual property (IP) piracy, counterfeiting, hardware Trojans, reverse engineering, and overbuilding attacks. Yet, various attacks that use a working chip as an oracle have been launched on logic locking to successfully retrieve its secret key, undermining the defense of all existing locking techniques. In this paper, we propose stripped-functionality logic locking (SFLL), which strips some of the functionality of the design and hides it in the form of a secret key(s), thereby rendering on-chip implementation functionally different from the original one. When loaded onto an on-chip memory, the secret keys restore the original functionality of the design. Through security-aware synthesis that creates a controllable mismatch between the reverse-engineered netlist and original design, SFLL provides a quantifiable and provable resilience trade-off between all known and anticipated attacks. We demonstrate the application of SFLL to large designs (>100K gates) using a computer-aided design (CAD) framework that ensures attaining the desired security level at minimal implementation cost, 8%, 5%, and 0.5% for area, power, and delay, respectively. In addition to theoretical proofs and simulation confirmation of SFLL's security, we also report results from the silicon implementation of SFLL on an ARM Cortex-M0 microprocessor in 65nm technology.