2021
Zhu, Huifeng; Guo, Xiaolong; Jin, Yier; Zhang, Xuan
PCBench: Benchmarking of Board-Level Hardware Attacks and Trojans Proceedings Article Forthcoming
In: IEEE/ACM Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference, Forthcoming.
Abstract | BibTeX | Tags: PCB Trust Verification
@inproceedings{Zhu2021PCBench,
title = {PCBench: Benchmarking of Board-Level Hardware Attacks and Trojans},
author = {Huifeng Zhu and Xiaolong Guo and Yier Jin and Xuan Zhang},
year = {2021},
date = {2021-01-01},
booktitle = {IEEE/ACM Asia and South Pacific Design Automation Conference},
abstract = {Most modern electronic systems are hosted by printed circuit boards (PCBs), making them a ubiquitous system component that can take many different shapes and forms. In order to achieve a high level
of economy of scale, the global supply chain of electronic systems has evolved into disparate segments for the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of PCB boards and their various associated
components. As a consequence, the modern PCB supply chain exposes many vulnerabilities along its different stages, allowing adversaries to introduce malicious alterations to facilitate board-level attacks.
As an emerging hardware threat, the attack and defense techniques at the board level have not yet been systemically explored and thus require a thorough and comprehensive investigation. In
the absence of standard board-level attack benchmark, current research on perspective countermeasures is likely to be evaluated on proprietary variants of ad-hoc attacks, preventing credible and
verifiable comparison among different techniques. Upon this request, in this paper, we will systematically define and categorize a broad range of board-level attacks. For the first time, the attack
vectors and construction rules for board-level attacks are developed. A practical and reliable board-level attack benchmark generation scheme is also developed, which can be used to produce references
for evaluating countermeasures. Finally, based on the proposed approach, we have created a comprehensive set of board-level attack benchmarks for open-source release.},
keywords = {PCB Trust Verification},
pubstate = {forthcoming},
tppubtype = {inproceedings}
}
Most modern electronic systems are hosted by printed circuit boards (PCBs), making them a ubiquitous system component that can take many different shapes and forms. In order to achieve a high level
of economy of scale, the global supply chain of electronic systems has evolved into disparate segments for the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of PCB boards and their various associated
components. As a consequence, the modern PCB supply chain exposes many vulnerabilities along its different stages, allowing adversaries to introduce malicious alterations to facilitate board-level attacks.
As an emerging hardware threat, the attack and defense techniques at the board level have not yet been systemically explored and thus require a thorough and comprehensive investigation. In
the absence of standard board-level attack benchmark, current research on perspective countermeasures is likely to be evaluated on proprietary variants of ad-hoc attacks, preventing credible and
verifiable comparison among different techniques. Upon this request, in this paper, we will systematically define and categorize a broad range of board-level attacks. For the first time, the attack
vectors and construction rules for board-level attacks are developed. A practical and reliable board-level attack benchmark generation scheme is also developed, which can be used to produce references
for evaluating countermeasures. Finally, based on the proposed approach, we have created a comprehensive set of board-level attack benchmarks for open-source release.
of economy of scale, the global supply chain of electronic systems has evolved into disparate segments for the design, fabrication, assembly, and testing of PCB boards and their various associated
components. As a consequence, the modern PCB supply chain exposes many vulnerabilities along its different stages, allowing adversaries to introduce malicious alterations to facilitate board-level attacks.
As an emerging hardware threat, the attack and defense techniques at the board level have not yet been systemically explored and thus require a thorough and comprehensive investigation. In
the absence of standard board-level attack benchmark, current research on perspective countermeasures is likely to be evaluated on proprietary variants of ad-hoc attacks, preventing credible and
verifiable comparison among different techniques. Upon this request, in this paper, we will systematically define and categorize a broad range of board-level attacks. For the first time, the attack
vectors and construction rules for board-level attacks are developed. A practical and reliable board-level attack benchmark generation scheme is also developed, which can be used to produce references
for evaluating countermeasures. Finally, based on the proposed approach, we have created a comprehensive set of board-level attack benchmarks for open-source release.
2020
Hoque, Tamzidul; Yang, Shuo; Bhattacharyay, Aritra; Cruz, Jonathan; Bhunia, Swarup
An Automated Framework for Board-level Trojan Benchmarking Miscellaneous
2020.
Abstract | Links | BibTeX | Tags: PCB Trust Verification
@misc{Hoque2020b,
title = {An Automated Framework for Board-level Trojan Benchmarking},
author = {Tamzidul Hoque and Shuo Yang and Aritra Bhattacharyay and Jonathan Cruz and Swarup Bhunia},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.12632},
year = {2020},
date = {2020-03-27},
abstract = {Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a functional failure or leakage of secret information during field operation. While researchers have been investigating the threat of malicious modification within the scale of individual microelectronic components, the possibility of a board-level malicious manipulation has essentially been unexplored. In the absence of standard benchmarking solutions, prospective countermeasures for PCB trust assurance are likely to utilize homegrown representation of the attacks that undermines their evaluation and does not provide scope for comparison with other techniques. In this paper, we have developed the first-ever benchmarking solution to facilitate an unbiased and comparable evaluation of countermeasures applicable to PCB trust assurance. Based on a taxonomy tailored for PCB-level alterations, we have developed high-level Trojan models. From these models, we have generated a custom pool of board-level Trojan designs of varied complexity and functionality. We have also developed a tool-flow for automatically inserting these Trojans into various PCB designs and generate the Trojan benchmarks (i.e., PCB designs with Trojan). The tool-based Trojan insertion facilitate a comprehensive evaluation against large number of diverse Trojan implementations and application of data mining for trust verification. Finally, with experimental measurements from a fabricated PCB, we analyze the stealthiness of the Trojan designs.},
keywords = {PCB Trust Verification},
pubstate = {published},
tppubtype = {misc}
}
Economic and operational advantages have led the supply chain of printed circuit boards (PCBs) to incorporate various untrusted entities. Any of the untrusted entities are capable of introducing malicious alterations to facilitate a functional failure or leakage of secret information during field operation. While researchers have been investigating the threat of malicious modification within the scale of individual microelectronic components, the possibility of a board-level malicious manipulation has essentially been unexplored. In the absence of standard benchmarking solutions, prospective countermeasures for PCB trust assurance are likely to utilize homegrown representation of the attacks that undermines their evaluation and does not provide scope for comparison with other techniques. In this paper, we have developed the first-ever benchmarking solution to facilitate an unbiased and comparable evaluation of countermeasures applicable to PCB trust assurance. Based on a taxonomy tailored for PCB-level alterations, we have developed high-level Trojan models. From these models, we have generated a custom pool of board-level Trojan designs of varied complexity and functionality. We have also developed a tool-flow for automatically inserting these Trojans into various PCB designs and generate the Trojan benchmarks (i.e., PCB designs with Trojan). The tool-based Trojan insertion facilitate a comprehensive evaluation against large number of diverse Trojan implementations and application of data mining for trust verification. Finally, with experimental measurements from a fabricated PCB, we analyze the stealthiness of the Trojan designs.