QFlow: Quantifying Data Leakage for RTL IP

@inproceedings{reimann2021qflow,

title = {QFlow: Quantitative Information Flow for Security-Aware Hardware Design in Verilog},

author = {Lennart M. Reimann and Luca Hanel and Dominik Sisejkovic and Farhad Merchant and Rainer Leupers},

url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.02379},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-01-01},

urldate = {2021-01-01},

booktitle = {IEEE International Conference on Computer Design},

abstract = {The enormous amount of code required to design modern hardware implementations often leads to critical vulnerabilities being overlooked. Especially vulnerabilities that compromise the confidentiality of sensitive data, such as cryptographic keys, have a major impact on the trustworthiness of an entire system. Information flow analysis can elaborate whether information from sensitive signals flows towards outputs or untrusted components of the system. But most of these analytical strategies rely on the non-interference property, stating that the untrusted targets must not be influenced by the source's data, which is shown to be too inflexible for many applications. To address this issue, there are approaches to quantify the information flow between components such that insignificant leakage can be neglected. Due to the high computational complexity of this quantification, approximations are needed, which introduce mispredictions. To tackle those limitations, we reformulate the approximations. Further, we propose a tool QFlow with a higher detection rate than previous tools. It can be used by non-experienced users to identify data leakages in hardware designs, thus facilitating a security-aware design process.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}